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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

WASHINGTON DC 20330

10 NOV 1982

REPLY TO
ATTN OF INS

SUBJECT Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments
(Your Memo, SECOM-D-344, 28 Oct 82)

TO Chairman
DCI Security Committee

1. We have carefully reviewed the UDIS paper on national policy on damage assessments and offer the following comments on the issues addressed in Part II:

a. Investigative Triggers: Concur that a full damage assessment should be required unless the agency head (or appropriate program manager) or designee expressly determines that this is not necessary.

b. Improved Quality Control: Within the Air Force (and DoD, to our knowledge) we believe there are sufficient checks and balances to ensure the timeliness and quality of damage assessments. Any expansion of this mechanism, to include the suggested designation of damage assessment individuals or teams, could not be supported without DoD approval and increased resources.

c. Assessment Implementation: Concur that the chain of command should be responsible for implementing corrective or remedial measures. Within the Air Force (and most DoD elements) the sheer number of incidents make it virtually impossible for the establishment of any central "tickler" or other "review system." We believe that assessment implementation should best be left to chain of command, Inspector General, or similar activities.


d. Sharing of Information: Concur as written. The publication of SECOM or ISOO newsletters, similar to our "INS-IGHT" would be a relatively inexpensive method of sharing summaries of investigations and related actions on cases involving significant compromises.

e. Data Base: The establishment of a data base on unauthorized disclosures would undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. However, such a base would be expensive to collect and maintain and involve jurisdictional problem areas. For example, within the Air Force, I could provide data relative to SCI incidents, but the inclusion of data relative to collateral incidents would require DoD approval and extensive coordination/approval with

other Air Force activities. We suggest that a modest data base be initially attempted and concentrate on high priority targets --media "leaks," involving SCI for example. If successful, gradual inclusion of other matters into the "data base" could then be attempted.

f. Regulations: Concur.

2. The UDIS should be commended on its reports on unauthorized disclosures and damage assessments. Both offered a clear insight into the problems facing the Intelligence Community.


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DCI Security Committee